Necessity Defence Cases that resulted in Innocence Verdicts or Severe Mitigation of Sentencing (incl. Murder)

Necessity Defence Cases that resulted in Innocence Verdicts or Severe Mitigation of Sentencing (incl. Mass Murder)

Mr. Geir Lippestad: Req for Clarity Re: guilt/innocence issue ignored in Breivik Trial by Prosecutors & Defence Counsel

Andrea Muhrrteyn | Norway v. Breivik | 13 August 2012

Request for Clarification regarding Defence Counsel’s focus on ‘sane/safety’ issue, while seemingly ignoring the ‘innocence/guilt’ issue, thereby denying Breivik’s right to Impartial trial to enquire into the evidence for and against his Necessity Defence.

Questions I have:

1. Why did Defence Counsel not demand Prosecutor Engh and Holden provide reasons for their refusal to address Breivik’s claim of necessity?

2. Is it common for Norwegian Prosecutors to refuse to provide the court with the Prosecutor’s Office assessment of an accused’s evidence for their claim of necessity?

3. In Norwegian Law upon which party does the Onus of Proof lie in a claim of necessity?

4. Is there some political correct conformity conspiracy between Defence Counsel and Prosecution to ignore Breivik’s claims of necessity?

5. Why did your Defence of Breivik state that the only issues before the court – as the media have been reporting and you said to the court – are the sane/safety issue?

6. How exactly can the only issue before the court be the ‘sane/safety’; since when is the ‘guilt/innocence’ issue irrelevant in a political criminal trial?

7. If Lippestad attorney’s are denying the court to be required to seriously examine the necessity evidence for Breivik’s guilt or innocence; upon what grounds and authority did Lippestad Attorney’s find Breivik to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

8. Or is it a matter of first ascertaining Breivik’s sanity; and then if, or when Breivik is finally deemed sane, does he then get a new trial with a focus on ‘guilty/innocence’ issue; to determine his innocence or guilt, based upon the evidence for and against his necessity defence?

9. If not, when exactly is Breivik entitled to an impartial trial where the issue before the court is Breivik’s ‘guilt/innocence’ and Prosecutors and Defence Counsel are required to seriously legally examine the evidence for and against his Necessity Defence?

As you are aware, I recently filed a Press complaint with PFU against News in English: Nina Berglund Erroneous Statement: 'Breivik Guilt Established Long Ago'.

In summary, according to my paralegsal understanding of the law: “The prosecutor’s irregular decisions to ‘refuse to touch Breivik’s invocation of Necessity’ does not: (a) have the power to nullify Breivik’s invocation of necessity; (b) grant the court the authority to ‘refuse to touch Breivik’s invocation of necessity’; (c) grant the media the authority to find Mr. Breivik ‘guilty’ in a ‘trial by media ignorance of the law’.

A Norwegian friend responded to my complaint to the PFU with:

"I would rather think this would be grounds for requesting a retrial due to gross neglect by his counsel. My thinking is that they all simply ignored his claim of necessity hoping that if all did the same no one would call out the bluff, the bluff being the absence of an imperative to discuss the claim of necessity. If both prosecution and defense behave as if it is simply so ridiculous that by ignoring it they "spared" Breivik of the humiliation of being confronted with how insane and ludicrous it is, then the court, the media and, more importantly, the public would by into that fraud as well."

My understanding of Norwegian and International/Foreign Law on Necessity (in attached PDF)

Excerpts: Mr. Geir Lippestad: Req for Clarity Re: guilt/innocence issue ignored in Breivik Trial by Prosecutors & Defence Counsel

Prosecutor Engh and Holden ‘Refuse to touch Breivik’s Principle of Necessity’:

The following reports indicate that Prosecutor Engh and Holden violated – what would in South African law be -- their duty of objectivity in terms of (a) impartially enquiring into and/or responding to the Accuseds’ Defence; and (b) providing the court with the Prosecution’s evaluation and conclusion of the evidence for and against Breivik’s invocation of his Necessity Defence.

In her closing statement, Prosecutor Engh acknowledge’s that:

(1) Norwegian prosecutors have a duty to conduct their investigation with objectivity;
(2) Norwegian law allows for an accused to plead to necessity and/or self defence,
(3) Where an accused does invoke necessity, it is the court and prosecutor’s duty to investigate the accused’s necessity defence arguments and evidence;
(4) If an accused successfully invokes a necessity defence, this can and must result in either mitigation of sentence and/or a verdict of innocence;
(5) Breivik invoked the defence of necessity;
(6) Despite the fact that Breivik invoked the necessity defence, both Prosecutor Engh and Holden ‘refuse to touch the principle of necessity’.

[..]

Onus of Proof: Norwegian State or Breivik to Prove Necessity?

In South African law the Onus of Proof lies on the State in a defence of necessity, to rule out the reasonable possibility of an act of necessity.

In S v Pretorius 1975 (2) SA 85 (SWA) Judge AJ Le Grange found that ‘Despite the accused’s plea of guilty, it appears from all the evidence on the record that an offence was not committed. In the result, the conviction and sentence, must, be set aside.’

[87] The accused who had no legal representation, referred, despite his plea of guilty, to circumstances which materially gave rise to the defence of necessity. This defence made it necessary for the magistrate to decide in the first instance not what the accused’s frame of mind had been, but whether necessity was present and whether it justified the accused’s conduct. .. The Judge ‘could find no cases and the Court did not refer to any where the question had been finally decided whether the test for necessity relates to an objective emergency or to a subjective frame of mind (or fear)…..

[88] There is, however, nothing in my humble opinion, in the cases referred to or in any other cases, which I could find, which could serve as authority for the proposition that necessity cannot also be viewed as “a ground of justification”. The question whether the defence of justification amounts to a ground of justification or to a circumstance excluding fault, has been thoroughly canvassed by De Wet and Swanepoel in their said work as well as by Burchell & Hunt in their revised edition of S.A. Criminal Law and Procedure, Part 1….

[89] The onus of proof in a defence of necessity as in self-defence rests on the State to rule out the reasonable possibility of an act of necessity. It is not for the accused to satisfy the court that she acted from necessity (p 293). [(proceed) by gathering an objective view of the circumstances from the evidence itself, and the magistrate’s finding whether the prevailing circumstances were ‘alarming’ if viewed objectively…. Viewed objectively… was the accused confronted with a situation that …… lives were in danger….

[90] [If the evidence gives a picture of threatening danger and fear, which gave rise to necessity and which would have justified the accused’s conduct, provided the accused did not exceed the limits of necessity…. Proceed to consider whether the proven circumstances satisfy the tests for necessity set out by B & Hunt at p. 285 of their work: (a) the threatening disaster endangered the accused’s legal interests. This in fact gave rise to a duty to act. (b) the danger was threatening and imminent. The fact that symptoms relating to the danger may only appear later does not detract from the situation… if it cannot immediately be ascertained whether or not the symptoms are dangerous, necessity arises… (d) the chances that harm would have resulted and it would have been of a serious nature.. the greater the harm, the greater the necessity…

If Norwegian law also places the Onus of Proof to lie on the State in a defence of necessity, to rule out the reasonable possibility of an act of necessity; it would appear that the Prosecutor’s decision to ‘refuse to touch the principle of necessity’ should weigh heavily in Breivik’s favour.

Even if Norwegian law places the Onus of Proof on Breivik in a defence of Necessity, to prove the reasonable possibility of an act of necessity, the Prosecutions decision to ‘refuse to touch the principle of necessity’ should again weigh heavily in Breivik’s favour; unless the Prosecution could and did provide a reasonable argument for their failure to uphold their duty for impartial objectivity to enquire into the evidence for the Defendant’s Necessity defence.


Common Law Necessity Defence Cases Resulting in Innocence Verdicts or Severe Mitigation of Sentencing:

In Regina v Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273, three crew members and a cabin boy escaped a shipwreck to spend eighteen days on a boat, over 1,000 miles from land, with no water and only two one pound tins of turnips. After four days, they caught and ate a small turtle. That was the only food that they had eaten prior to the twentieth day of being lost at sea. Ultimately, two of the crew members killed the ailing cabin boy and “fed upon the body and blood of the boy for four days.” Four days later, they were rescued. Two of the men were charged with murder. The court found that the cabin boy would likely have died by the time they were rescued and that the crew members, but for their conduct, would probably have died as well. The Queen's Bench Division Judges held that the defendants were guilty of murder in killing the cabin boy and stated that their obvious necessity was no defence. The defendants were sentenced to death, but this was subsequently commuted to six months' imprisonment.

In Spakes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), the Texas Criminal Appeals Court allowed the jury to be instructed on the necessity defense before deliberating the verdict for an inmate whose three cellmates had planned an escape and threatened to slit his throat if he did not accompany them. The defendant inmate argued that because of the terribly violent crimes of which his cellmates had been convicted (one had bragged about chopping his girlfriend up with an ax), it was a necessity that he break the law, by accompanying them in their escape.

In United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873, 873-74 (C.C.D. Mass 1834) (No. 14,470), sailors prosecuted for mutiny were found not guilty, after arguing the necessity for their mutiny based upon the dangerously leaky ship and that this danger had been concealed from them until after they left port. Circuit Justice Story found them not guilty of mutiny.

In United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383), Holmes was involved in a shipwreck, where the crew were charged with manslaughter for throwing sixteen passengers overboard in a frantic attempt to lighten a sinking lifeboat. The Prosecutor argued the passengers should be protected at all costs, whereas the Defence placed the jurors in the sinking lifeboat with the defendant. The Defendant was found guilty, but the jurors requested leniency, to which the court complied by sentencing the defendant to six months in prison and a fine of twenty dollars.

In the 1919 Arizona decision of State v. Wooten, commonly referred to as the Bisbee Deportation case, Professor Morris describes the acquittal of a Sherrif based upon the ‘necessity’ for committing Kidnapping as follows:

On April 26, 1917, soon after the United States entered World War I, the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) called a strike of copper miners in Cochise County, Arizona. On July 12, 1917, the county sheriff led a posse that rounded up and deported over 1,000 members of the IWW. One of the posse was brought to trial on charges of kidnapping. He offered to prove that the strikers were trying to obstruct the war, had stored up a large amount of ammunition, and had threatened citizens; that help from federal troops had been sought to no avail; and that the leader of the local strike had told the sheriff he could no longer control his men. On these facts, he asserted the defense of necessity.

The judge recognized the defense. He ruled that evidence of necessity could be excluded only if it were completely inadequate as a matter of law to establish the defense, and that the weight and sufficiency of the evidence were for the jury to decide—even in a case which “aroused great public interest.”

The jury heard the evidence, deliberated for fifteen minutes, and returned a verdict of “Not Guilty” on the first ballot.

In Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853), a large fire threatened the unburned half of the then small town of San Francisco. A public officer ordered the destruction of houses to create a firebreak and was subsequently sued by one of the owners. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the action was proper because:

The right to destroy property, to prevent the spread of a conflagration, has been traced to the highest law of necessity, and the natural rights of man, independent of society and the civil government. "It is referred by moralists and jurists as the same great principle which justifies the exclusive appropriation of a plank in a shipwreck, though the life of another be sacrificed; with the throwing overboard goods in a tempest, for the safety of the vessel; with the trespassing upon the lands of another, to escape death by an enemy. It rests upon the maxim, Necessitas inducit privilegium quod jura private." [Necessity leads to privileges because of private justice].


Civil Disobedience Political Necessity Defence Cases Resulting in Innocence Verdicts or Severe Mitigation of Sentencing:

According to Civil Disobedience and the Necessity Defence:

[If] the [necessity] defense is allowed, the jury is called upon to weigh controversial political issues and to function as the “conscience of the community.” “Reflected in the jury’s decision is a judgment of whether, under all the circumstances of the event and in the light of all known about the defendant, the prohibited act, if committed, deserves condemnation by the law.” In cases where judges have been persuaded to allow the necessity defense, juries have, often enough, delivered not guilty verdicts.

[..] When judges have allowed the necessity defense to go to a jury in civil disobedience cases, more often than not the defendants are acquitted. There are a number of cases in which charges were dropped after the judge announced that the necessity defense would be permitted.

In State v. Mouer (Columbia Co. Dist. Ct., Dec. 12-16, 1977), dozens of protestors in Oregon who were conducting a civil disobedience sit-in at a nuclear power plant were arrested and charged with criminal trespass. At trial, the judge allowed the defendants to raise the state necessity defense (called the choice of evils defense) and the defendants were acquitted by the jury.

In People v. Brown (Lake County, Jan. 1979), protesters in Illinois blocked the entrance to a nuclear power plant and were charged with criminal trespass. Relying on the defense of necessity, they argued that they had not created the situation that they had sought to correct and had reasonably believed that their conduct was necessary to avoid the harm of a nuclear accident. A doctor testified for the defense about the damaging effects of low-level radiation. All of the defendants were subsequently acquitted.

In People v. Block (Galt Judicial Dist., Sacramento Co. Mun. Ct., Aug. 14, 1979), eleven California protestors were charged with trespass and resisting arrest in connection with a March 31, 1979 demonstration at the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant. The defendants had climbed over a fence and staged a sit-in on the grounds of the plant. At trial, the judge allowed the necessity defense to be presented to the jury. “After seven weeks of trial, nine of the defendants received a split jury verdict and one was acquitted, apparently because he had a long history of activism and had convinced the jury that he had exhausted all legal means to stop the harm” posed by the power plant. The cases against those defendants who received a split jury verdict were eventually dropped.

In California v. Lemnitzer, No. 27106E (Pleasanton-Livermore Mun. Ct. Feb. 1, 1982) the trial of a protestor who condemned the development of nuclear weapons at the Lawrence Livermore Lab in California ended in a hung jury after the court allowed the presentation of evidence supporting the necessity defense. On retrial, the protestor, John Lemnitzer, was acquitted.

In Vermont v. Keller, No. 1372-4-84-CNCR (Vt. Dist. Ct. Nov. 17, 1984) protestors staged a sit-in at the Vermont office of United States Senator Robert Stafford in an effort to get a public meeting about American policy in Central America. These actions resulted in their arrest on trespass charges. At trial, the court allowed the defendants to raise the defenses of necessity, international law, including the Nuremberg principles, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court allowed a number of impressive experts to testify about human rights atrocities in El Salvador and Nicaragua, as well as the important role of protest in American foreign policy. The defendants further testified they had attempted “every reasonable manner to communicate” with the Senator. The jury acquitted all of the defendants.

In Michigan v. Jones et al., Nos. 83-101194-101228 (Oakland County Dist. Ct. 1984) the State of Michigan held nine separate trials prosecuting fifty-one defendants who blocked access to a plant where cruise missile engines were being manufactured. The defendants were charged with trespass, disturbing the peace, blocking access, and conspiracy. In a trial where the necessity defense was allowed, the jury acquitted the defendants of all charges except failure to obey a traffic officer. In other cases where the necessity defense was allowed, the juries acquitted the defendants on all charges. In trials where the judge did not allow necessity defenses, the defendants were convicted on several counts.

In Michigan v. Largrou, Nos. 85-000098, 99, 100, 102 (Oakland County Dist. Ct. 1985), three protestors at a Michigan cruise missile plant were charged in 1985 with trespass and criminal damage to a fence. The court found that although the defendants willfully violated the law, they did so without malice and for the public purpose of protest. All three were acquitted.

In People v. Jarka, Nos. 002170, 002196-002212, 00214, 00236, 00238 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Apr. 15, 1985), an Illinois jury acquitted twenty defendants who protested against the American military invasion of Central America by conducting a sit-in which blocked the road to the Great Lakes Naval Training Center. The protestors successfully invoked the doctrine of necessity and were allowed to put eight expert witnesses on the stand to offer evidence of the effect of nuclear weapons, American intervention in Central America, and international law. The trial judge gave the jury an instruction that stated that the threat and use of nuclear weapons violated international law.

In Chicago v. Streeter, Nos. 85-108644, 48, 49, 51, 52, 120323, 26, 27 (Cir. Ct., Cook County Ill. May 1985), a jury was faced with eight protestors who were charged with trespass for refusing to leave the office of the South African consul. The jury was allowed to hear expert evidence about the defense of necessity and international crimes committed by the apartheid policies of South Africa. It took the jury two and a half hours to acquit the defendants.

In Washington v. Heller (Seattle Mun. Ct. 1985), eight doctors were charged with trespassing for protests staged on the porch of the home of the South African consul. They were allowed to raise the defense of necessity and admit expert testimony about the medical and other effects of apartheid. The Seattle jury acquitted after little more than an hour and made a post-trial statement supporting anti-apartheid protests.

In Colorado v. Bock (Denver County Ct. June 12, 1985), twenty-two Pledge of Resistance members were charged with trespass for occupying the office of a United States Senator from Colorado to protest American policy in Central America. The jurors, who were allowed to hear evidence of necessity, were instructed that the defendants could use civil disobedience only as an “emergency measure to avoid imminent public or private injury” but that the injury did not have to be directed against the defendants. The jury acquitted all of the defendants.

In Massachusetts v. Carter, No. 86-45 CR 7475 (Hampshire Dist. Ct. 1987), the daughter of former President Jimmy Carter, Amy Carter, was arrested with fifty-nine others and charged with trespass and disorderly conduct at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruitment activities on the campus of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The fifteen defendants were allowed to present evidence to support the necessity defense, international law, and the Nuremberg principles. The defendants argued that the crimes they committed were of far lesser harm than those being committed by the CIA in Central America and offered testimony by a former contra leader and former CIA and government officials. The judge instructed the jury that they could acquit the defendants if they concluded that the defendants acted out of a belief that their protest would help stop the clear and immediate threat of public harm. The jury acquitted them in three hours.

In Washington v. Bass, Nos. 4750-038, -395 to -400 (Thurston County Dist. Ct. April 8, 1987), several dozen students of Evergreen State College sat in the Washington State Capitol in support of an anti-apartheid disinvestment bill. Seven students refused orders to leave and were arrested and charged with trespass and disorderly conduct. At their trial, the defendants were allowed to admit statistical and expert evidence of necessity, international law, and the Nuremberg defense about the situation in South Africa. The jury acquitted all of the defendants.

In Illinois v. Fish (Skokie Cir. Ct. Aug. 1987) twenty-six people were arrested for trespassing at the Arlington Heights Army Reserve Training Center. The trial court allowed the jury to hear evidence about the necessity defense. All of the defendants were acquitted.

In State v. McMillan, No. D 00518 (San Luis Obispo Jud. Dist. Mun. Ct., Cal. Oct. 13, 1987), fourteen protestors blockaded Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant to prevent the loading of fuel rods. The trial judge allowed fourteen expert witnesses to offer testimony about related potential harm for the area and allowed the defendants to testify about their own related fears. The judge applied the necessity defense and acquitted the defendants.

In 1988, a North Carolina court acquitted two Tuscarora Indians of charges in connection with their taking of twenty hostages at the office of a local newspaper to protest the alleged corruption of county officials.

In Massachusetts v. Schaeffer-Duffy (Worcester Dist. Ct. 1989), five defendants tried to pass out leaflets to employees at a GTE nuclear weapons facility and prayed outside the building when they were denied entry. The judge denied the prosecutor’s motion in limine to prevent evidence of necessity. The jury was allowed to hear the defendants’ testimony about their personal efforts to stop nuclear weapons and their religious beliefs, and expert testimony about the threats of the MX missile, religious teachings against nuclear weapons, and the historical effectiveness of civil disobedience. The jury acquitted the defendants of trespass.

In 1990, in Omaha, Nebraska, a jury acquitted seventeen anti-abortion protestors because of the necessity defense. The trial judge relied on the defense to overturn the trespassing convictions of an additional eighteen defendants.

IN West Valley City v. Hirshi, No. 891003031-3 MC (Salt Lake County, Ut. Cir. Ct., W. Valley Dept. 1990), protestors were charged with criminal trespass after entering property on which Trident II nuclear missile engines were being manufactured in Salt Lake City. The trial judge permitted evidence and instructed the jury on defenses based on necessity, international law, the First Amendment, and the Nuremberg Principles. The jury acquitted the defendants.

In People v. Gray, 571 N.Y.S.2d 851, 861-62 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.1991), a two-day bench trial resulted in the acquittal of six protestors for disorderly conduct because of the necessity defense. The protestors had blocked traffic in Manhattan to protest the opening of a bike and pedestrian lane to vehicular traffic. Judge Laura Safer-Espinoza issued a forty-two page decision reviewing dozens of decisions involving the necessity defense and provided the most extensive judicial overview of the necessity defense in state courts to date.

In 1991, a Chicago jury acquitted a Catholic priest of criminal charges for damage to the inner-city neighborhood where he was pastor after he admitted painting over three tobacco- and alcohol-related billboards. The defendant argued he should not be convicted because of the necessity defense. The jury deliberated ninety minutes before acquitting the defendant.

In 1993, a jury acquitted a Chicago AIDS activist charged with illegally supplying clean needles because of the necessity defense.

In California v. Halem, No. 135842 (Berkeley Mun. Ct. 1991), the jury came to the same conclusion after hearing evidence that dispensing clean needles without a prescription, though illegal, was necessary to protect people from the spread of the AIDS virus.

In Washington v. Brown, No. 85-1295N (Kitsap County Dist. Ct. N. 1985), twenty-four protestors held a vigil in Washington State in protest of a “white train” carrying nuclear weapons. The state arrested twenty of the protestors and charged them with criminal trespass and conspiracy. The defendants filed extensive briefs on the right to present particular defenses to the jury, in support of their motion to dismiss conspiracy charges, and in opposition to the government’s motion in limine. The judge dismissed the conspiracy charges and did not admit evidence on the necessity defense, but it did allow Daniel Ellsberg to testify as an expert on why first-strike nuclear warheads on a train are a potential threat to peace. One defendant pled guilty to both charges. The jury acquitted the remaining nineteen defendants.

In Washington v. Karon, No. J85-1136-39 (Benton County Dist. Ct. 1985), four defendants blockaded a federal Plutonium-Uranium extraction facility at Hanford Nuclear Reservation. They were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct and failure to disperse. The defendants filed motions in limine to raise necessity, Nuremberg principles, and the Geneva and Hague Conventions as defenses. The trial judge allowed Nuremberg and necessity defenses, permitted expert testimony regarding radiation contamination, and refused expert testimony regarding nuclear war. The court agreed to give international law instructions to the jury. Immediately after the court ruling permitting scientists to testify on radiation contamination, the prosecution moved to dismiss the case and the court granted the motion.

In United States v. Braden (W.D. Ky. 1985), twenty-nine demonstrators entered the office of a United States senator as part of the Pledge of Resistance. At their arraignment, the defendants announced their intent to use Nuremberg, necessity, and First Amendment defenses (freedom of speech includes freedom to be heard; today the only way to be heard is to act). The government dropped all charges prior to trial.

In California v. Jerome, Nos. 5450895, 5451038, 5516177, 5516159 (Livermore-Pleasanton Mun. Ct., Alameda County, Traffic Div. 1987), more than thirty protestors blocked the main gate to the Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Weapons Lab in a nonviolent sit-in. They were arrested for traffic offenses of blocking and delaying traffic. The Traffic Commissioner agreed to consider expert testimony on the necessity defense and international law (including Nuremberg Principles, Geneva Protocols, and the Hague Convention) via affidavits. The defendants filed affidavits for Daniel Ellsberg (on the effectiveness of nonviolent protests in arousing citizen action), Frank Newman (on international law) and Charles Schwartz (on the role of Livermore Lab in promoting the arms race). Before trial, the judge granted the prosecution’s request to drop all charges.

I would appreciate it if you could provide the answers to my questions:

1. Why did Defence Counsel not demand Prosecutor Engh and Holden provide reasons for their refusal to address Breivik’s claim of necessity?

2. Is it common for Norwegian Prosecutors to refuse to provide the court with the Prosecutor’s Office assessment of an accused’s evidence for their claim of necessity?

3. In Norwegian Law upon which party does the Onus of Proof lie in a claim of necessity?

4. Is there some political correct conformity conspiracy between Defence Counsel and Prosecution to ignore Breivik’s claims of necessity?

5. Why did your Defence of Breivik state that the only issues before the court – as the media have been reporting and you said to the court – are the sane/safety issue?

6. How exactly can the only issue before the court be the ‘sane/safety’; since when is the ‘guilt/innocence’ issue irrelevant in a political criminal trial?

7. If Lippestad attorney’s are denying the court to be required to seriously examine the necessity evidence for Breivik’s guilt or innocence; upon what grounds and authority did Lippestad Attorney’s find Breivik to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

8. Or is it a matter of first ascertaining Breivik’s sanity; and then if, or when Breivik is finally deemed sane, does he then get a new trial with a focus on ‘guilty/innocence’ issue; to determine his innocence or guilt, based upon the evidence for and against his necessity defence?

9. If not, when exactly is Breivik entitled to an impartial trial where the issue before the court is Breivik’s ‘guilt/innocence’ and Prosecutors and Defence Counsel are required to seriously legally examine the evidence for and against his Necessity Defence?

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